Progress pill
How freedom works

The ability to govern oneself

Freedom as a Social Project

The ability to govern oneself

  • The good use of freedom
  • Harming oneself: freedom that destroys itself
  • Harming others: war against humankind
  • From primitive vice to the capacity for self-government

The good use of freedom

After examining the facts that ground the doctrine of liberty and the historical evolution of freedom and constraint, we arrive at a crucial preliminary question before studying how freedom operates in practice. For freedom to truly assert itself as a project for society, and for it to make genuine progress in history, it must be well used. And to use freedom well, one must first learn to use it.
Two essential principles guide this apprenticeship. The first: do no harm to yourself. If one squanders one's own strength, if one uses freedom in an uninformed or reckless manner, one may destroy the very freedom one seeks to exercise. The second: do no harm to others. Those who attack the freedom of others place themselves at war with humankind and with society, and in organized societies this war inevitably results in a severe diminution of one's own freedom through the intervention of judicial and police institutions.
Beyond these two protective principles, there is a third requirement: to use freedom with maximum useful effect. This optimization of freedom is made possible by the technological and technical developments we have traced in the preceding part, the fruit of a long historical process. When we analyze the facts of history, what matters most is not the succession of political powers or territorial battles, but this gradual development of freedom and the apprenticeship that accompanies it.
Charles Dunoyer (1786-1862), a political economist, journalist, and close associate of Charles Comte, spent the better part of his career arguing that moral and intellectual development was the true engine of civilizational progress. His major work, L'industrie et la morale considérées dans leurs rapports avec la liberté (1825), remains one of the most ambitious attempts to ground the theory of liberty in the observable facts of human nature. He wrote, near the opening of that work:
"Freedom is not a gift that societies receive ready-made from the hands of nature or of legislators. It is a conquest, slow and painful, which requires of men that they govern their passions, discipline their impulses, and submit to the long apprenticeship of self-command. The savage is not free in the true sense of the word; he is merely ungoverned. To be truly free, one must be capable of governing oneself."
In other words, the mere absence of external constraint is not yet freedom: it is only the precondition for freedom, which must then be constructed from within.
Indeed, this interior dimension of liberty is what distinguishes the French liberal tradition from the merely political liberalism that reduces freedom to a set of constitutional arrangements. For Dunoyer and his colleagues, freedom begins inside the individual, with the capacity to direct one's own faculties toward useful ends.

Harming oneself: freedom that destroys itself

What happens when freedom is exercised without this interior discipline? Alcoholism provides a particularly enlightening example of a use of freedom that ultimately harms the person exercising it. It begins as a free act, but it gradually diminishes the individual's capacity for freedom by placing him in a state of dependence. The immediate effects of excessive consumption are compounded by more distant effects: a loss of faculties, a reduced willpower, a diminished possession of oneself and one's own forces.
More generally, intemperance and all actions or habits that deprave, enervate, or brutalize our faculties are obstacles to true freedom. The more these behaviors impair our capacities, the less free we are to make enlightened use of them, or indeed any use at all. Dunoyer described this self-inflicted diminution with characteristic precision:
"Intemperance, licentiousness, idleness: these are not merely moral faults in the eyes of the preacher. They are, in the most rigorous sense, destructions of capital. The man who squanders his health, his faculties, and his time is not simply sinning against his own soul; he is impoverishing himself in the most literal and material fashion, depriving himself of the very instruments with which alone he could have won a larger measure of independence."
In other words, the libertine who believes he is expressing his freedom is in truth contracting it, hour by hour, until nothing remains of the sovereign self he imagined himself to be.
Indeed, the paradox of self-destructive freedom is among the most important insights of the liberal tradition. Freedom is not self-maintaining; it requires cultivation, the way a garden requires tending. Neglect it, and weeds will overgrow the very space where liberty was to flourish.

Harming others: war against humankind

When an individual harms others, whether by threats, endangerment, or outright violation of their rights, he enters into a state of war with the human race. But what does this war cost him? Not only does he risk the punitive reaction of organized society; he also destroys the very web of peaceful exchange from which he himself could have benefited.
The Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743), the Norman-born cleric and indefatigable project-maker who devoted his long life to the rational organization of peace among nations and individuals, grasped this logic with remarkable clarity. In his Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe (1713), he observed:
"The man who lives by violence against his neighbours does not merely injure them; he injures himself. He breaks the chain of mutual services and exchanges from which all wealth derives. He substitutes, for the productive labour that would have enriched both parties, a barren conflict that leaves both poorer than before. Security is not merely a moral good; it is the first condition of all prosperity."
In other words, peace and security are not sentimental luxuries added on top of the economic order: they are its very foundation.
Charles Dunoyer, drawing on the accounts of travelers and explorers who had visited societies resembling those of humanity's earliest ages, illustrated why these conditions made men less free than modern societies can offer. His descriptions deserve to be quoted at length:
"VORACITY. When the natives of New Holland have killed a seal, says Péron, cries of joy rise on all sides; nothing is thought of but the feast; the ferocious victors group themselves around their victim; it is torn apart on every side at once; each man eats, sleeps, wakes, eats, and sleeps again. INCONTINENCE. The savage has little inclination to pleasure. It is the effect of the rigors of his condition, of the hunger he endures, of the exhausting fatigues he supports. But the savage is cold without being continent; and wherever a less harsh condition renders him more disposed to the pleasures of love, the licentiousness of his morals is excessive. IMPROVIDENCE. The savage, says Robertson, does not think of building a hut until he is compelled by the rigor of the cold, and if the weather softens while he has his hand to the work, he abandons his task unfinished, without thinking that the cold might ever return. When the Carib has slept, he would give his hammock for a trifle; in the evening, he would sacrifice everything to recover it; and the next day, he would give it away again for nothing, without thinking of his regrets of the day before."
These testimonies contradict the representations inherited from Rousseau and demonstrate that freedom is a construction, a becoming, an apprenticeship that depends on the moralization and industrialization of men.

From primitive vice to the capacity for self-government

It is the progress of self-government that has enabled the great advances from the ancient and primitive epochs: from slavery to serfdom, and from serfdom to a freedom that is increasingly unregulated and effective. Today, we are gradually arriving at a society of potentially free men, precisely because they have acquired the moral and intellectual capacities necessary to make enlightened use of their liberty.
What does this progress consist in, concretely? It consists in the gradual substitution of self-discipline for external constraint. Dunoyer expressed the point with admirable directness:
"The great transformation of modern civilization may be summarized thus: external discipline is being replaced by interior discipline. The whip gives way to the conscience; the master gives way to the free man who has mastered himself. This is not a diminution of social order; it is social order raised to its highest power, because it no longer requires the costly apparatus of compulsion."
In other words, the freest societies are not those where constraint has disappeared, but those where it has migrated inward, becoming self-imposed rather than externally inflicted.
Indeed, this historical evolution demonstrates that freedom is not a natural state; it is the result of a civilizational process. Having established these preconditions, we can now examine the factual elements concerning freedom itself: its effects and how it operates in practice. This understanding is essential if we are to make freedom a coherent and feasible project for society.
Quiz
Quiz1/5
According to the text, what is the third requirement for using freedom properly, beyond not harming oneself and not harming others?