Progress pill
Philosophy of liberalism

Freedom rooted in human facts

Freedom as a Social Project

Freedom rooted in human facts

  • Freedom rooted in the facts of human existence
  • Freedom works; unfreedom fails
  • Reform, not revolution; opinion, not force

Freedom rooted in the facts of human existence

This course on freedom as a project for society rests on a fundamental conviction that deserves to be forcefully reiterated in conclusion: freedom is neither a utopia nor a mere abstract theory, but is deeply rooted in the facts of human existence. The first part of the course established this essential foundation by examining the realities that characterise the human condition. Among these fundamental facts, self-ownership occupies a central place, for it is precisely because man owns himself that he can legitimately possess things, material goods, and land. Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836) and Cabanis (1757–1808), the great Ideologists of the early nineteenth century, derived the entire edifice of liberal thought from this single anchoring observation: the body is mine because I feel it, will through it, and act with it. This human variety, this irreducible individuality, is the foundation on which any serious reflection on freedom must be built.
What does the examination of historical conditions reveal? It reveals a gradual and slow process, full of reversals and detours, but oriented in a direction that the liberal tradition has always identified. Ancient societies lived under extreme hazards and constant danger, operating according to modes of production based on violence and the collective appropriation of wealth rather than on the creation of new value. Yet history shows a remarkable tendency for authority to be replaced by contract, which makes it clear that socialist and interventionist solutions are in fact backward-looking. Communism appears as the most regressive form of this tendency, taking us back to the time of tribes on a national and international scale.
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), whose De la démocratie en Amérique (1835–1840) remains one of the monuments of liberal political analysis, captured this movement with his characteristic double vision, at once hopeful and cautionary:
"Nations of our time cannot prevent conditions from becoming equal; but it depends upon themselves whether equality is to lead them to servitude or to freedom, to knowledge or barbarism, to prosperity or to wretchedness. The march is irresistible; but the destination is not fixed in advance. That depends on us."

Freedom works; unfreedom fails

The concrete mechanisms by which freedom produces its beneficial effects have been examined in detail throughout this course: prices and profits that guide production, exchange and contract that ensure every transaction is mutually advantageous, the satisfaction of needs through economic freedom. In contrast, unfreedom in its various forms, from complete communism to excessive taxation and over-regulation, breaks the fundamental human bonds of individuality and will. It substitutes tutelage for personal choice and replaces the contract with politics, with its defective and costly functioning.
Indeed, authors such as Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and the Physiocrats before him had perfectly anticipated this failure. The Physiocrats did not merely assert laissez faire as a slogan; they derived it from a rigorous analysis of how agricultural production, the ultimate source of all wealth in their view, requires freedom of initiative to flourish. Any interference with this initiative, however well-intentioned, destroys the spontaneous coordination that makes productivity possible.
To maintain itself despite its repeated failures, unfreedom must rely on sophisms: distorted representations of reality that enable the public to retain confidence in systems that collapse as soon as they are seriously examined. The intellectual sophism, which offers false definitions of freedom; the democratic sophism, which confuses the voice of the majority with the recognition of individual rights; the economic sophisms, which treat labour as an end in itself and postulate a permanent opposition of interests between producers and consumers; the social sophism, which invents class exploitation where there is only voluntary exchange; and the international sophism, which applies variable-geometry recognition of property depending on the nationality of the claimant: all reveal the same fundamental weakness. In other words, a system with no real foundation must compensate with an abundance of words, a proliferation of justifications, a permanent theatre of good intentions.

Reform, not revolution; opinion, not force

The programme of freedom that emerges from this analysis must be bold, for it is founded on the real principles of human nature: self-ownership, individual autonomy, and contract. It implies a reduction in the powers of the state and a transformation of public services into private ones, with increasing reliance on free exchange. But the French liberal tradition teaches with one voice that reforms are to be preferred to revolutions. Tocqueville demonstrated masterfully in L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution (1856) that revolutionary upheavals cost a great deal without transforming society as much as they promise, often resulting in the consolidation of the very centralising power they set out to destroy.
The example of the campaign for the abolition of the Corn Laws in nineteenth-century England illustrates, better than any theoretical argument, the way forward. Richard Cobden (1804–1865), the cotton manufacturer turned statesman, and John Bright (1811–1889), together with the Anti-Corn Law League, achieved one of the most complete and durable victories of the liberal cause in history, not by revolution, not by insurrection, but by the patient, methodical education of public opinion.
Frédéric Bastiat, who attended the League's meetings in Manchester and Birmingham in 1845 and was electrified by what he witnessed, reported back to his French readers with barely contained enthusiasm. He described in his Cobden et la Ligue (1845) the scene he had observed:
"Cobden spoke for two hours without notes, without effort, with a simplicity and a precision that reminded me of nothing so much as a mathematician demonstrating a theorem to students already convinced of his good faith. He did not flatter his audience; he instructed them. He did not inflame their passions; he enlightened their reason. And when he sat down, the applause that followed was not the applause of a crowd intoxicated by rhetoric but of men who feel that they have understood something, and that what they have understood is true."
Richard Cobden himself, in one of his great speeches to the League, stated the matter with a simplicity that Bastiat found irresistible:
"I have no doubt that we shall succeed. We have on our side the great permanent interests of humanity: the interest of the consumer in buying at the lowest price, the interest of the worker in selling his labour in the largest possible market, the interest of the nation in substituting the peaceful arts of commerce for the costly and destructive arts of war. These interests do not require to be manufactured or excited; they require only to be understood. Our task is not agitation; it is education."
This method of convincing through the debate of ideas remains the goal to be pursued today. It is perfectly in tune with the values of competition, freedom, and perfectibility that liberalism stands for. The march of history leads us toward ever greater freedom. It is our task to ensure that this march is accomplished through peaceful reform and enlightened opinion rather than through violence and upheaval. Indeed, as Cobden and his League demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt, reason patiently applied to willing minds is the most powerful political force in the world.
If you wish to continue exploring these ideas, we recommend the following courses. The first examines the Austrian school of economics, the intellectual heir to many of the French liberal insights encountered here. The second invites you to situate your own political convictions on the map of ideas:
Quiz
Quiz1/5
According to the analysis of ancient societies versus free societies, what characterized the production modes of early communities that distinguished them from liberty-based economic systems?