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Asymmetric Cryptography

The key distribution and management problem

Modern Cryptography Fundamentals

The key distribution and management problem

As with symmetric cryptography, asymmetric schemes can be used to ensure both secrecy and authentication. By contrast, however, these schemes employ two keys rather than one: a private and a public key.
We start our enquiry with the discovery of asymmetric cryptography, particularly the problems that spurred it on. Next, we discuss how asymmetric schemes for encryption and authentication work on a high level. We, then, introduce hash functions, which are key to understanding asymmetric authentication schemes, and also have relevance in other cryptographic contexts, such as for the hash-based message authentication codes we discussed in Chapter 4.

Suppose that Bob wants to buy a new rain coat from Jim’s Sporting Goods, an online sporting goods retailer with millions of customers in North America. This will be his first purchase from them and he wants to use his credit card. So, Bob will first need to create an account with Jim’s Sporting Goods, which requires sending over personal details such as his address and credit card information. He can, then, go through the steps needed to purchase the rain coat.
Bob and Jim’s Sporting Goods will want to ensure that their communications are secure throughout this process, considering that the Internet is an open communications system. They will want to ensure, for example, that no potential attacker can ascertain Bob’s credit card and address details, and that no potential attacker can repeat his purchases or create fake ones on his behalf.
An advanced authenticated encryption scheme as discussed in the previous chapter could certainly make the communications between Bob and Jim’s Sporting Goods secure. But there are clearly practical obstacles to implementing such a scheme.
To illustrate these practical obstacles, suppose that we lived in a world in which only the tools of symmetric cryptography existed. What could Jim’s Sporting Goods and Bob, then, do to ensure secure communication?
Under those circumstances, they would face substantial costs to communicating securely. As the Internet is an open communications system, they cannot just exchange a set of keys over it. Hence, Bob and a representative for Jim’s Sporting Goods will need to make a key exchange in person.
One possibility is that Jim’s Sporting Goods creates special key exchange locations, where Bob and other new customers can retrieve a set of keys for secure communication. This would obviously come at substantial organizational costs and greatly reduce the efficiency with which new customers can make purchases.
Alternatively, Jim’s Sporting Goods can send Bob a pair of keys with a highly trusted courier. This is probably more efficient than organizing key exchange locations. But this would still come at substantial costs, particularly if many customers only make one or a few purchases.
Next, a symmetric scheme for authenticated encryption also forces Jim’s Sporting Goods to store seperate sets of keys for all their customers. This would be a signficant practical challenge for thousands of customers, let alone millions.
To understand this latter point, suppose that Jim’s Sporting Goods provides each customer the same pair of keys. This would allow each customer—or anyone else that could obtain this pair of keys—to read and even manipulate all the communications between Jim’s Sporting Goods and its customers. You might, then, as well not use cryptography at all in your communications.
Even repeating a set of keys for only some customers is a terrible security practice. Any potential attacker could attempt to exploit that feature of the scheme (remember that attackers are assumed to know everything about a scheme but the keys, in accordance with Kerckhoffs’ principle.)
So, Jim’s Sporting Goods would have to store a pair of keys for each customer, regardless of how these key pairs are distributed. This clearly presents several practical problems.
  • Jim’s Sporting Goods would have to store millions of pairs of keys, one set for each customer.
  • These keys would have to be properly secured, as they would be a sure fire target for hackers. Any breaches of security would require the repetition of costly key exchanges, either at special key exchange locations or by courier.
  • Any customer of Jim’s Sporting Goods would have to safely store a pair of keys at home. Losses and thefts will occur, requiring a repetition of key exchanges. Customers would also have to go through this process for any other online stores or other types of entities they wish to communicate and transact with over the Internet.
These two main challenges just described were very fundamental concerns until the late 1970s. They were known as the key distribution problem and the key management problem, respectively.
These problems had always existed, of course, and often created headaches in the past. Military forces, for instance, would have to constantly distribute books with keys for secure communication to personnel in the field at great risks and costs. But these problems were becoming worse as the world was increasingly moving into one of long-distance, digital communication, particularly for non-governmental entities.
If these problems had not been resolved in the 1970s, efficient and secure shopping at Jim’s Sporting Goods would likely not have existed. In fact, most of our modern world with practical and secure e-mailing, online banking, and shopping would probably be just a distant fantasy. Anything even resembling Bitcoin could not have existed at all.
So, what happened in the 1970s? How is it possible that we can instantly make purchases online and securely browse the World Wide Web? How is it possible that we can instantaneously send Bitcoins all across the world from our smart phones?
Quiz
Quiz1/5
Why is exchanging keys in person impractical for secure online communications?